ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

Some fifty years ago the eminent political sociologist Seymour Martin
Lipset wrote a paper reviewing the politics of policing. It was called 'Why Cops Hate Liberals and Vice Versa', and demonstrated that the police tended towards the Right in their political sympathies and practices (Lipset, 1969) . This was related to the fundamental role of the police, order maintenance, which involves both enforcing dominant standards of propriety in the streets on a routine everyday basis, and the 'high policing' function of suppressing threats to the political and socio-economic status quo (Brodeur, 2010) .
As pointed out by Otwin Marenin, reproducing order is a Janusfaced activity. It encompasses both the maintenance of 'general order', the preconditions of any viable social co-operation and coexistence, which is in everyone's interest, and 'special order', the protection of dominant elites and social hierarchy against the less powerful and privileged. As Marenin neatly puts it, policing involves both 'parking tickets' and class repression (Marenin, 1982) .
The consequence of this is that although governments in liberal democratic states have sought to construct a veneer of legitimacy for the police as politically neutral enforcers of impartial law, the 'class repression' dimension is hard to disguise especially in times of crisis.
Right-wing partisanship often becomes blatant. It has often been apparent, on the one hand in more favourable treatment of police by conservative governments, and on the other hand, a reciprocal support for them manifest in individual police sympathies and in pressure group activity. 
THE OLD POLITICS OF THE POLICE
De-politicisation of the Police 1829-1970
The modern police were established in the early 19 th century in the face of widespread opposition (Reiner, 2010, Chaps. 2,3) . Amongst other concerns many feared that the police would be a partisan tool of government oppression. Working-class leaders and Radicals in particular saw the new police as a thoroughly political military and spy agency, 'the minion and paid servant of the Government' (Poor Man's Guardian, 11 October 1830, p. 3) .
In the US a key factor in legitimating the police was the notion that electoral democracy would prevent the domination of policing by elite interests, although this did nothing of course to prevent tyranny of the majority against racial, religious and other minorities (Miller, 1999) . In Britain this legitimating tactic was not available. Only the upper class had the vote at the time of the creation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, and the franchise only incorporated the middle class in 1832. By the time the skilled working class 'aristocracy of labour' got the vote in 1867, the police had been established throughout the country by the 1856 County and Borough Police Act.
The strategy adopted in Britain to assuage fears about elite control of the police was to represent them as politically neutral, impartial upholders of a universalistic law that applied equally to all. The architects of modern British policing, Sir Robert Peel and the first two Metropolitan Police Commissioners Rowan and Mayne, declared that in the midst of acute social conflict they 'endeavoured to prevent the slightest practical feeling or bias, being shown or felt by the police . . . the force should not only be, in fact, but be believed to be impartial in action, and should act on principle' (cited in W. Miller, 1999, p.12) .
To implement this objective, the British police were insulated from direct political control, and national and local government police authorities tended to abstain from interventions in operational policy. During the 1920s, this discreet stance hardened into a strict legal doctrine of constabulary independence from policy guidance (Lustgarten, 1986) . In addition, although enfranchised in 1887, police officers remain forbidden to join or affiliate to outside trade unions on the ground that this would impugn their political impartiality, although in 1919 a 'company union' the Police Federation was established, destroying an illegal police union.
Insistence on suppressing indications of overt political control or partisanship softened the initial conception of the police as a tool of government oppression. As an 1864 article in Chambers's Magazine said of the police, 'they know nothing of politics; the man in blue preserves his neutral tint . . . the good old cause of order is the only side the policeman supports' (cited in Miller, 1999, p.13) .
Re-politicisation of the Police 1970-1992
During the 1970s and 1980s policing became re-politicised, as the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher made tough law and order a central plank of her successive General Election victories over Labour (Reiner, 2007, Chap.5) . Conservative election manifestoes and campaigning castigated Labour as soft on crime and anti-police.
During the late 1970s, in the build-up to her election victory in 1979, Mrs Thatcher blamed the Labour government directly for rising crime and disorder, pledging a 'ring of steel' to protect people against lawlessness. She promised to boost the resources and powers of the police to prevent and clear-up crime, and to toughen penal policy, reversing the softness on crime that she attributed to Labour. The Tory's law and order campaign was greatly helped by the emergence of the police as a political lobby, backing up the Conservative's agenda in a series of advertisements and speeches (Reiner, 2010, pp. 88-91) . During the 1970s the police at all levels became overtly involved in public debate, with much publicised interventions that were almost invariably on the Tory side. The On all these issues Labour took a civil libertarian stance, attacking the Conservative government for violating the principles of the rule of law. Labour also attacked Conservative law and order policies for being counter-productive in increasing social divisions, and aggravating rather than reforming the root causes of crime that lay in social inequality and relative deprivation. Whilst this social democratic analysis may have had the support of many criminologists (at least until the late 1970s), it was an electoral liability for Labour (Reiner, 2012) . In the 1984 and 1987 General Elections the Tories attacked Labour for being 'soft' on crime because of its concerns about civil liberties, 'permissiveness', links with trade unionism (which they associated with disorder), and failure to develop any short-term solutions to bolster public protection. Core aspects of Labour's traditional stance on crime and social order became electoral 'hostages to fortune' in the face of this onslaught (Downes and Morgan, 2012) .
In office after 1979, the Thatcher Tories petted the police with special treatment saving them from the attacks on the public sector generally. They were exempt from the wide-ranging public expenditure cuts, and from the New Public Management disciplines that sought to achieve the 'three E's' (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). In the face of a wave of urban riots and industrial militancy unprecedented in postwar Britain, public order policing was militarized. There were new toys for the boys in blue: Nato helmets, shields, long truncheons, CS gas, plastic bullets, enhanced legal powers, and a ring-fencing of 'constabulary independence' from efforts by Labour controlled local authorities to question militaristic policing (Reiner, 2010, pp. 85-88) .
New Labour, New Consensus 1992 -2005 The love affair between the Tories and the police cooled somewhat in the late 1980s, as public expenditure cuts and New Public Labour government there was a continuous expansion of police numbers, resources, and legal powers (Reiner, 2007, pp. 134-5; Chap.7).
On the other hand, New Labour was favourable to the New Public Management agenda initiated by the Conservatives, and in office implemented the 'businesslike' reform of police management and governance with at least as much rigour as the Tories (Savage, 2007, Chaps. 3,5) . Their commitment to this was signaled early on by the 1999 Local Government Act and its 'Best Value' scheme which 'raised the culture of performance management to another level altogether' (Savage, 2007, p. 110) . The collection and analysis of performance indicators and the 'league tables' they generated became ever more rigorous and sophisticated (Savage, 2007) . liberalism. They claimed that the Tories' 'conventional law-and-order stance was sacrificed to the civil libertarians. They questioned the use of CCTV, removed suspected murderers and rapists from the DNA database and replaced control orders with a watered-down system that has led to the current dangerous situation where suspected terrorists who can't be deported or tried, are free to walk the streets of our cities' (Johnson, J and Clarke, C., 2014) .
Coalition and the Cops
The Conservative-led Coalition's policing policies embody a profound rupture in the politics of policing. The Conservatives have been tougher on the police than any 'old' Labour government would ever dare to be. This is a much deeper change than just applying to the police the general public expenditure cuts being implemented in the name of 'austerity', unlike the Thatcher era special case treatment of the police budget. There has been a much broader assault on police autonomy and powers. Relations with the police, the Tories' erstwhile pets, are at an all-time low. This comprises: 15,400 police officers; 13,400 police staff; and 2,900
PCSOs. Forces' plans show that 95% of these planned workforce reductions for the whole spending review period should already have been made by March 2014 ' (HMIC, 2013 ).
The government claims its cuts will not threaten police performance and public safety because they are accompanied by fundamental reforms of pay, conditions of service, management, and governance that eliminate inefficiencies, and incentivize the police to produce more from less (embodied largely in the Winsor Reports: For example, the planned increase in the proportion of the workforce on the 'frontline' is highlighted over the fact that this nonetheless means an absolute reduction (HMIC 2013: 16) . The 'frontline' is defined simply as 'crime-fighting' in the same paragraph, even though many, probably most, calls for service and police operations concern emergencies not reducible to crime-fighting (Reiner, 2010, pp. 141-7) . The whole report is framed as a response to 'austerity', which is treated as an inevitable act of God rather than a contentious policy choice (Blyth, 2013; Stuckler and Basu, 2013; Seymour, 2014) , and to which there are cogent alternatives (Krugman, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013 ).
There is a rapidly growing critical literature on the Coalition's policing project (eg Jones et al, 2012; Lister, 2013 Lister, , 2014 Reiner, 2013; Turner 2014) . A judicious critique, accepting the validity of some measures, but questioning others, is provided by the Report of the Independent Police Commission chaired by former Met Commissioner Lord Stevens, established but not controlled by the Labour Party (Stevens, 2013) , and the wide-ranging volume of essays prepared as evidence for it (Brown, 2014) .
What is beyond doubt is that the Coalition's package, love it or loath it, amounts to a dramatic weakening of police power, autonomy, pay, and conditions of service. The purpose of this chapter is not to add to the burgeoning literature, indicated previously, assessing the virtues and vices of the reforms, but to probe why this has happened at the hands of the Tory Party, formerly the avid paramour of the police, and why now.
Explaining Coalition/Conservative Cop Reforms
What is beyond doubt is that the Coalition's package, love it or loathe it, amounts to a dramatic weakening of police power, autonomy, pay, and conditions of service. The purpose of this chapter is not to add to the burgeoning literature, indicated previously, assessing the virtues and vices of the reforms, but to probe why this has happened at the hands of the Tory Party, formerly the avid paramour of the police, and why now.
The programme, self-billed as 'the most radical change to policing in 50 years', was not proposed because of a law and order crisis. For reasons that remain debated, from the mid-1990s recorded crime fell consistently, throughout the Western world (Reiner 2016: Chap. 7). The most convincing explanation is the 'security hypothesis': the adoption of much more effective physical and situational crime prevention (Farrell et al., 2014) , which was a universal trend whilst policing and penal policy varied between different jurisdictions. The part played in the crime drop by policing is questionable, but it certainly helped satisfy performance targets and took pressure off the remorseless demand for more police.
The decline in crime and political/industrial disorder thus reduced the demand for policing -the police may have done their job too well.
Although opinion surveys suggest most people believe crime has continued to rise overall, despite the contrary statistical evidence, they do not feel this about their own neighbourhoods or through personal experience, as they did in the 1980s and early 90s. Beneath the trends in crime an even deeper change in the political economy and culture of British society underlies the transformation of the policing landscape. This is the rise of neoliberal hegemony over the last four decades, remorselessly eliminating any space for alternatives to free market economics and its culture of narcissistic individualism, which has been strengthened rather than weakened by such apparent shocks as the post-2008 economic crisis (Mirowski, 2013; Gamble, 2014; Streeck, 2014) .
The consequences for crime, criminal justice and policing are profound. The key link between neoliberal political economy and policing is the growth of massively greater inequality (Reiner, 2007) . The growth of inequality generates problems of order that the police must deal with. Econometric studies show that increasing inequality is directly linked with a growth of expenditure on policing overall (Jayadev and Bowles, 2006; Ergul, 2011, 2013; Bowles and Jayadev, 2014) , and within that a shift from public police to private security. In so far as the crime drop of recent years is attributable primarily to better physical security that is mainly purchased privately, this too is related to inequality. Although all sections of society have benefitted from the crime reduction, there is evidence it has disproportionately advantaged the wealthy who can pay for more and better security (Tilley et al., 2011) .
In terms of theoretical analysis of the police function, the balance between general and particular order is shifting. The rise of the publicly provided police in the early 19 th century was part of a modernist project of constructing a broadly universal order based on a common status of citizenship in which all shared, albeit unequally (Reiner, 2010, Chaps 2,3) . Given the survival of some inequality the order reproduced was simultaneously general and particular, but over time the former became more significant, until the late 1970s.
Overt inequality in the delivery of policing services was seen as illegitimate, although it has always survived.
It is significant that the creation of the modern police was opposed not only by the working class, who were not yet incorporated into citizenship, but also by the elite. The aristocracy and gentry saw state policing as an unnecessary expense. The ruling class was protected from the 'dangerous classes' by physical segregation and private retainers (Silver, 1967) .
Analysts of the growth of private security have long seen this as threatening a return to pre-modern policing forms, a 'new feudalism' (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Zedner, 2006) , suggesting a dystopian vision in which the privileged float free, cocooned from the masses in security bubbles (Davis, 1990) . These Blade Runner nightmares are not here yet, but the massive increases in inequality and the cutbacks in public provision of all services, including policing, point in that direction.
The bottom line politically permitting the Conservative police reforms is that the powerful are simply less dependent on public police protection, benefitting from bespoke services that are cheaper than extending universal guardianship to all citizens. Neoliberal theorists have long argued that only a 'night watchman' state can be justified as a call on taxation that would receive universal assent (Nozick, 1973) . But this overlooks the degree of redistributive benefit in publically financed policing. In the present conjuncture the police are being rolled back with the rest of the state, and privatization, with no mandate for the public good, flourishes. 
CONCLUSION
